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INTRODUCTION

We are now in the midst of what is generally regarded as the third
great merger wave in our industrial history. A few statistics will indicate
the nature and size of the present movement.' The amount of assets being
acquired by acquisition is immense by any absolute standard. The figures
have risen almost geometrically in recent years. From 1948 to 1954, the
assets involved in acquisitions of medium-size corporations (those with
over ten million dollars in assets) averaged less than a billion dollars per
year. From 1955 through 1962, the annual average was approximately
two billion dollars. In 1963 and 1964, the average rose to three billion
dollars. By 1966, the annual average value of medium-sized corporate
acquisitions had risen to four billion dollars. During 1967, the figure
doubled. In 1968 the figure had risen to twelve billion dollars and the
figures for the first three months of 1969 indicate that the annual rate will
be over eighteen million dollars.
Acquisitions by very large companies are an important part of the
present wave. This country's two hundred largest industrial corporations
acquired 6.98 billion dollars of assets from medium-size companies in
1968 alone-over 55% of the assets that were acquired that year from
medium-size companies. The top 272 companies, those with over 250
million dollars in assets, acquired 9.2 billion dollars in assets in 196873% of all the assets bought from medium-size companies (those with
over 10 million dollars in assets). A very significant number of mediumsize firms have already been acquired, and an increasing number of very
large firms have recently been acquired. From 1948 through 1968, almost
* This paper was originally prepared in September of 1969 and therefore does not
necessarily speak as of the date of publication. The footnotes were prepared by the
Editorial Staff of the University of Miami Law Review.
** Member of Law Firm of Lord, Day, and Lord, New York, Visiting Lecturer in
Law, Yale Law School.
I. These statistics appearing in the text were taken from BUREAU OP ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CURRENT TRENDS m MERGER ACTIVITY

No. 3 (1969).
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1300 medium-size firms were acquired, 192 of them in 1968 alone. There
were less than 2700 such firms in existence in 1968. Acquisitions over the
past twenty years had cut their number by almost one-third. Only six
companies with assets of over 250 million dollars were acquired from 1948
through 1966. However, six such firms were acquired in 1967 alone, and
twelve more were acquired in 1968.
Gross industrial concentration in the country, which was already
high enough to concern Congress when it amended the Clayton Act in
1950, has risen considerably since World War II. This rise has been, in
large part, due to acquisitions. In 1948, the 100 largest industrial corporations in the country owned 40% of the manufacturing assets in the country; by 1967 they controlled 48% of these assets. In 1948, the 200 largest
industrial corporations owned 48% of the manufacturing assets; by 1967
they owned 59%. A very substantial part of this increase was due to
acquisitions by these very large companies. Indeed, approximately 90%
of the increase in the share of total manufacturing assets controlled by
the top 100 and the top 200 from 1960 to 1967 was directly due to acquisitions during those seven years.
Although mergers in the late 1800's and early 1900's were principally
horizontal, and those in the 1920's were horizontal and vertical, mergers
in the last few years have been principally conglomerate. Since 1965, over
85% of all assets acquired from medium-size companies were acquired
in conglomerate acquisitions. The figure for 1968 alone was 89%.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the applicability of the antitrust laws to the conglomerate merger wave. Two basic statutes are involved. The Sherman Act, passed in 1890 in part to deal with an earlier
merger wave, prohibits "every . . . combination in the form of trust or
otherwise . . . in restraint of trade" as well as every combination to
monopolize.' Acquisitions, mergers, consolidations, and holding companies
as well are "combinations" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The
key question is whether they are "in restraint of trade."' Section 7 of the
Clayton Act was first enacted in 1914 and was amended in 1950 to close
various loopholes. This section prohibits any corporate acquisition of
some or all of the stock or assets of any other corporation "where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." 4 The purpose of Section 7 is to prohibit restraints of trade
in their incipiency long before they reach Sherman Act proportions;
therefore, the Clayton Act is the more stringent law. It is the one always
relied on except when technical procedural or substantive provisions
2. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sherman Act with numerical
section].
3. Id.
4. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Clayton Act with numerical
section].
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make the Sherman Act alone applicable to a particular merger. The application of the Clayton Act alone will be discussed later in detail.
Mergers are usually classified as either "horizontal"-involving
firms selling the same product in the same area, "vertical"-involving
firms in a supplier-customer relationship, or "conglomerate"-which is
descriptive of all others. Often conglomerate mergers are subdivided into
"product extension"-involving firms with complementary products,
"market extension"-involving firms selling the same product in different areas, and "other." Sometimes the catagory "other" is subdivided
into "concentric"-involving firms whose products are related in terms
of sources of raw materials, product development, production technology,
or marketing channels, and "pure conglomerate"-involving firms with
unrelated products. However, since the same legal standard applies to all
mergers, and since most substantial mergers have horizontal and vertical
aspects as well as congeneric or conglomeric aspects, it appears most
fruitful to regard all mergers involving one or more multi-market companies as conglomerate mergers and to discuss the various ways in which
such mergers may substantially lessen competition. Such mergers may
violate the Clayton Act, because they may eliminate actual competition,
eliminate potential competition, foreclose competitors from sources of
supply or customers, increase reciprocity, or reduce the vigor of competition within specific markets.
II.

HORIZONTAL COMPETITION

A conglomerate merger may involve two companies which are,
among other things, engaged in purchasing, producing, or distributing
the same or competitive products in the same area. In the pending
Northwest Industries-B. F. Goodrich litigation, for example, the government has alleged that both Northwest and Goodrich are engaged in the
manufacture and sale of caustic soda in the inland waterway area served
by the Mississippi and Ohio rivers.5 The law applicable to mergers of firms
engaged in such direct competition is fairly clear in many respects. The
Supreme Court has held that competition in concentrated markets is
usually so much less vigorous than competition in unconcentrated markets, that any acquisition which substantially increases concentration or
substantially lessens the possibility of eventual deconcentration, may
substantially lessen competition within the meaning of the Clayton Act. 6
The key factors in determining illegality in this area are: (1) the shares
of the market held by the leading companies in the market; (2) whether
those shares have been increasing, decreasing, or stable in the past several
years; (3) the shares of the market held by the companies involved in the
acquisition; and (4) the competitive vigor of the company whose inde5. United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
6. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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pendence is being eliminated by the acquisition. The higher the degree of
concentration in the market, the longer that degree of concentration has
been in existence, the greater the degree of increasing concentration, the
larger the shares of the market of the companies engaged in the acquisition, and the more vigorous the competition of the company being acquired, the more likely it is that the Supreme Court will hold the merger
illegal. Some specific cases will throw light on the state of the law in this
area. In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,7 the Court held
that any merger creating a company with around 30% of the market
would violate the Clayton Act, at least if the acquired company was not
of de minimus size. The Court further indicated that an even lower figure
might violate the statute in some cases. In United States v. Continental
Can,8 the Court held that a merger creating a company with 25% of the
market was illegal. In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,' the Court held
that since the grocery market in the Los Angeles County-Orange County
area had shown a steady tendency toward concentration for over a decade,
a merger of two of the top six grocery chains in the area was illegal;
although their total share of the market was only 7.5%. In United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co.,"° the High Court stated that since there had been a
constantly increasing degree of concentration in the beer industry for over
three decades, a merger of the tenth largest brewer with the eighteenth
was illegal on the national level although their combined share of the
national market was only 4.49%. In United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America," the Court regarded the aluminum conductor market as
"highly concentrated" where there were nine manufacturers with 96%
of the market. The Court, in Pabst,was concerned with a market in which
there were 162 producers, a decrease of 44 producers in five years. The
top ten producers had increased their share of that market from 45.06%
to 52.6% during the same period.' 2 In Vons, the Court was concerned
about a market with almost 4,000 sellers. The number of sellers had
dropped almost 30% in 11 years, and the share controlled by the top
eight firms had risen from 34% to 41%. 1 The Court in Continental Can
was concerned about the elimination of Hazel Atlas as an independent
factor in the can-glass market because although, Hazel Atlas controlled
only 3% of that market, the six top companies in the market had 70% of
total sales.' 4 In Alcoa-Rome, the Court was concerned with the elimination
of Rome as an independent factor. Although it had only 1.3% of the
market, it was an aggressive efficient company, and there were only a
7. Id.
8. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
9. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
10. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
11. 377 U.S. 271 (1964). See also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969).
12. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966).
13. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1966).
14. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1964).
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dozen companies in the market with 1%o of total sales. 5 In summary, the
Court has fully embraced oligopoly theory and decided that any acquisition that eliminates an effective competitor, adds to the market shares of
the leaders in a concentrated market, reduces the possibility that a
presently concentrated market will deconcentrate through natural economic forces, or is part of a trend that threatens to transform an
unconcentrated market into a concentrated market over a period of
several decades is illegal under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.16
A. Definition of Markets
If market concentration and shares of markets are crucial indicia to
illegality, proper definition of markets is essential to sound decision
making. In the Reynolds case, for example, if the proper product market
was "alumnium foil," the acquired company's share of the market was
.25%, while, if the proper product market was "florist foil," its share of
the market was 33%7. 17 If the proper market was "the nationwide
market for rolled steel products," the acquired company's share of the
market in the Columbia Steel case was .4%. If the proper market was
"plates and shapes in the West," the appropriate figure was 137o." A
proper market is one in which the sellers within the market have some advantage over sellers outside the market, so that it is meaningful to insist on
maintaining competition among sellers within the market although they
compete to some degree with sellers outside the market." a But no group
of sellers has any advantage over any other group of sellers that cannot
be overcome in time at some cost. The key question is how much of a
cost-time advantage a group of sellers must have over another group of
sellers before it can be said that the group belongs in a separate market
for Section 7 purposes. There is no simple answer to that question. All
that can be done is to exercise the best judgment based on all of the facts
relating to a particular situation in the light of the underlying values which
the antitrust laws are designed to promote. In view of the antitrust laws'
traditional concern with the political and social implications of industrial
concentration and the welfare of small business, and the merger wave we
are currently experiencing, it is reasonable to expect that courts will-and
Alcoa-Rome"' and Continental Can" indicate the Supreme Court willregard any non-gerrymandered product or geographic market as a market
15. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278 (1964).
16. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United
States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969).
17. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
18. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 509 (1948).

19. The text states the author's view and no case precisely so holds. See notes 17 and
18 supra.
20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
21. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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for Section 7 purposes where one of the parties to the merger is a very
large company. 2
There are two reasons, one substantive and one remedial, why many
antitrust experts feel that the strict doctrines the Supreme Court has developed in dealing with mergers involving direct horizontal competitors will
not substantially affect the current conglomerate merger pattern. On the
substantive side, many conglomerate mergers have no horizontal aspects;
indeed, many conglomerates purposely seek to acquire companies which
are not direct competitors to avoid the impact of the horizontal rules.
Furthermore, as to those conglomerate mergers which involve direct
competition, many will involve markets which are not concentrated and
are not tending toward concentration, or they will involve lethargic firms
which are not among the leaders in the market involved. Although, as
Continental Can illustrates, the courts will probably stretch market
definitions, where very large corporations are concerned, to find that
competition exists between similar products or similar technologies, the
process of stretching creates a problem of substantiality. For example, in
the pending Allis Chalmers-White Consolidated litigation, the Federal
Trade Commission has alleged that Allis Chambers and White are competitors in the production of machinery, using all types of machinery as
a line of commerce. 24 However, once the market is defined as broadly as
"machinery," there are over a thousand other competitors to consider, and
25
Allis Chalmers and White combined have only 1.5% of the market.
No court has ever suggested, much less held, that a merger of competitors
with such a small share of a market was substantial enough to violate the
26
Clayton Act.

B. Available Remedies
The remedy problem is probably even more significant. The statute
provides that a merger is illegal if it may substantially lessen competition
in any line of commerce in any section of the country.27 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that if a merger has the requisite effect in a
single line of commerce anywhere, it is illegal regardless of its effects
in all other lines of commerce.2 8 Thus, if a conglomerate merger between
two multi-market companies, each of which has over a billion dollars in
22. See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J.
1969).
23. Id.
24. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1969), reversing, 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 567 (1970).
25. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263, 1268
(D. Del. 1969).
73,213
26. See United States v. Wachovia Corp., 5 TRADE REc. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
at 88,820 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
27. Clayton Act § 7 (1964).
28. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) ; United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,
378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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assets and sales and each of which has 15% of the $200,000 widget market,
the entire merger is illegal due to the probability of a substantial lessening
of competition in the widget line of commerce. However, in the early
Union Pacific2 9 case under the Sherman Act and in the 1960 Brown Shoe"°
case under the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court suggested that all the
courts might do under these circumstances would be to order the companies involved to dispose of one of the company's widget businesses. The
theory is that the merger is only illegal because of its probable effect in the
widget market and that once that probable effect is eliminated by restoring
two independent entities in the widget business, the merger is no longer
illegal. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
have apparently settled several suits on this basis, and a district court
adopted a similar approach in the pending Atlantic-Richfield-Sinclair
litigation. 8' If this approach is sound, the 272 industrial firms with over
250 million in assets could probably acquire all of the remaining firms in
the country by acquiring them and then spinning off assets in those
markets where concentration was high or increasing and in which either
the acquiring or acquired firm was a leading firm. With almost 300
companies to share the markets involved, the process would appear to be
feasible. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may eventually prohibit
the above technique using several theories.
First, it is well established standard antitrust doctrine that one of the
purposes of relief in antitrust cases is to deprive guilty defendants of the
fruits of their illegal activity. One basis for the doctrine is the moral
principle that no one should benefit from a violation of the law. Another
basis is the practical argument that persons should be deterred from
violating the law since there are not enough resources available to enforce
the law through litigation alone. Preventing persons from benefiting from
violations at least deters them to that extent. However, in the Foremost
Dairiescase, Foremost was allowed to acquire McKesson & Robbins with
annual sales of $844,000,000, although the acquisition violated the Clayton
Act, merely because Foremost thereafter agreed to sell its SCA business,
with annual sales of $44,000,000.82 It is doubtful either that any moral
principle was vindicated in the Foremost Dairies case, or that Foremost
or other companies familiar with the situation will be substantially deterred from further illegal acquisitions.
Second, well established traditional antitrust doctrine holds that in
relief proceedings all doubts should be resolved against the guilty defendant and in favor of the public interest in fully restoring the competitive
situation altered by the violation involved. 3 Where a case is settled by
29. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
30. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
31. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), mem.,
297 F. Supp. 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
32. Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,835
(F.T.C. 1967).
33. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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allowing the companies involved to spin off some assets to avoid the most
obvious anticompetitive effects of the merger, the competitive situation
will almost always have been changed by the illegal acquisition. In
Foremost," for example, it is true that after Foremost acquired McKesson
and subsequently divested SCA, there were still two separate entities in
the drug manufacturing and wholesaling business.85 However, prior to the
acquisition and divesture, SCA had the resources of Foremost behind it
in competing with McKesson and other firms in the industry; after the
acquisition the giant McKesson had Foremost's resources behind it in
competing with pigmy SCA and the rest of the industry. How can anyone
say with any degree of certaintly how effective SCA would be as a competitor after it had been acquired by Foremost, been part of its operations
for some time, and then spun off as an independent entity? How, for
example, can anyone measure the effect of such activity on the morale of
SCA employees in general and on the short-term and long-term decisions
of middle management personnel, in particular as to whether to go with
SCA or stay with Foremost-McKesson? Why should the public bear the
risks that SCA is no longer as effective a competitor as it was prior to the
time Foremost illegally acquired McKesson?
In United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,8 6 the trial court
rejected Schlitz' contention that one way to deal with Schlitz' illegal
acquisitions of Labatt stock would be to have Labatt sell its stock in
General Brewing, a substantial direct competitor of Schlitiz on the West
Coast. The theory, in part, was that General, backed by Labatt, would
be a stronger competitor of Schlitz in the West and a more likely potential
national competitor of Schlitz than General would be when divested of
Labatt's financial, managerial, and technical support. The point is not
whether the district court was correct in its factual conclusions in Schlitz,
but whether courts should be engaged in trying to make judgments of
this sort in view of the substantial possibility of error and the additional
fact that the whole situation arises only because of the defendant's illegal
activity in the first place.
Third, and probably most important, is the basic issue of the purpose
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. If Section 7 was designed solely to deal
with probable effects on competition in specific markets, then it makes
sense to say that once the probable effect on competition is clearly and
fully eliminated, the merger is not obnoxious under the statute. But
Congress was not solely interested in specific economic effects in specific
markets when it passed Section 7.87 The Congressional reports and debates
indicate a concern for small business, local ownership of business, and the
34. See note 32 supra.
35. See United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1969 Trade Cas. ff 72,886 at 87,336
(D.N.J. 1969).
36. 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
37. For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the 1950 amendment
see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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political and social implications of increasing control of the nation's total
assets in the hands of fewer and fewer corporations. 8 In both the House
and Senate reports, for example, the committees pointed with alarm at the
degree of gross industrial concentration in the country, not merely at
concentration in specific markets. 39 In Brown Shoe,40 Chief Justice Warren
said that the statute must be interpreted not only in terms of "the probable
effects of the merger upon the economics of the particular markets affected
but also ... its probable effects upon the economic way of life sought to be
preserved by Congress."'" In Procter & Gamble,42 Justice Harlan, who
represents a conservative approach to merger problems, recognized that
"congressional concern in enacting Section 7 extended not only to anticompetitive behavior in particular markets, but also to the possible
economic dominance of large companies which had grown through merger. ' '4 3 Following this approach, the Court may eventually hold that
Congress adopted the "may substantially lessen competition in any line
of commerce '44 language solely as a test of legality-as opposed to a flat
prohibition on all mergers or on all mergers by companies with assets
over a specific amount (e.g., $250,000,000) or on all mergers involving
acquisitions of assets over a specific amount (e.g., $10,000,000)-but that
once a merger is illegal under that test of legality, the only proper remedy
to fully carry out the values Congress intended to protect by amending
Section 7 is to order complete divestiture of the assets acquired and
permanently enjoin the entire transaction. The Court is particularly
likely to so hold if the present conglomerate merger wave continues to
threaten a transformation of the industrial structure of our country into
one inconsistent with the "economic way of life" Congress sought to
preserve by enacting Section 7. The closest case in point is the duPontGeneral Motors45 remedy opinion of 1961; an opinion recently reaffirmed
in unusually strong terms in the Court's recent El Paso Natural Gas
remedy opinion." In duPont-GeneralMotors, the District Court47 held
elaborate hearings and entered a very detailed injunctive decree, including
provisions depriving duPont of stock voting rights. 8 The decree was
designed to eliminate the possibility that retention by duPont of its
ownership of 23% of General Motors stock would cause GM to dis38. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 11486, 11489-1495, 11498 (1949); 96 CoNG. REc. 16444,
16448, 16450, 16452, 16503 (1950).
39. See Senate Report on the original Act. S. REP. No. 698, 63 Cong., 2d Sess. (1914);
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
8,10-11 (1949).
40. Brown Shoe Co. v.United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
41. Id. at 333.
42. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
43. Id. at 589 (concurring opinion).
44. Clayton Act § 7 (1964).
45. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
46. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
47. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
48. Id. at 41.
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criminate in favor of duPont in purchases of auto seat covers and auto
parts, the only line of commerce which led to a finding of illegality in
the case.49 The District Court decided to use an elaborate injunctive
decree rather than order duPont to sell its stock, because (1) it felt the
injunctive decree would be effective to eliminate discrimination, and (2)
the hearings convinced the Court that the tax and market consequences
of forcing duPont to sell its General Motors stock or to distribute it to its
shareholders would cost duPont and its shareholders well over a billion
dollars.5 0 The Supreme Court did not dispute the fact that divestiture
would cost duPont and its shareholders well over a billion dollars but
stated that it was irrelevant if divestiture was necessary to fully effect
relief. After evaluating the facts, the Court found divestiture to be necessary." Close examination of the Court's opinion fails to reveal why the
injunctive decree was not substantially as effective as divestiture; the most
reasonable reading of the opinion is that there are some possibilities that
divestiture could be more effective than any injunctive decree, and, since
all doubts should be resolved against the defendants,' once they are found
to have violated the Clayton Act, divestiture should be ordered although
the doubts would not have been sufficient to support a finding of a violation
of the Act in the first place. The total annual sales of automobile seat
covers and automotive paint duPont made to General Motors was less
than $20,000,000 in 1947-48.52 DuPont would have been much better off
getting out of the automobile seat cover and automotive paint business
than selling its stock in General Motors, but nothing in the opinion
suggests that duPont and its shareholders could have avoided over a billion
dollar loss by having duPont divest itself of its automotive paint and
automobile seat cover business. DuPont5 and the recent El Paso"4 opinion
indicate the Supreme Court will hold that full divestiture is the only
proper remedy, whenever a merger violates the Clayton Act in any line
of commerce. At least this will be true where a very large company is
involved.
III. VERTICAL COMPETION

Conglomerate mergers will often involve companies in actual or
potential supplier-customer relationships. In the pending ITT litigation, 55
for example, the government alleges that one of the effects of ITT's recent
acquisitions is that Hartford may supply ITT's insurance requirements,
Grinnell may supply ITT's automatic sprinkler requirements, and Canteen
may supply ITT's requirements of vending and in-plant food services.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 51-2.
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969),
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In the Allis Chalmers-White Consolidated complaint, the Federal Trade
Commission alleged that one of the effects of that acquisition is that
competitors of Allis in the manufacture of large gyratory and cone
crushers and certain types of mills and rotary kilns may be cut off from
adequate supplies of very large steel castings during times of short
supply. 6 In dealing with supplier-customer acquisitions, the courts have
been concerned with the fact, as these complaints indicate, that such
acquisitions may cut off competitors from adequate sources of supply or
from adequate customers or outlets, or may make supplies or customers or
outlets available only at discriminatory prices or on discriminatory terms.
The courts have held such mergers to be illegal under the Clayton Act
whenever the amount of foreclosure was sufficiently large enough to
threaten an extension of market power from one level to another;
to eliminate substantial amounts of cross market bargaining pressure; to
increase barriers to entry, for example, by increasing capital costs or
product differentiation; or to appear unfair to competitors of the merging
parties .5157

Here again, as with horizontal mergers, the key factors have been
the degree of concentration in the markets involved, the trend of concentration in those markets, and the share of the markets involved. Intent and
prior dealings between the parties involved and between them and others
have often been important because of the "fairness" element. The cases illustrate the range of figures the courts consider substantial. In the duPontGeneral Motors case, the Court held that duPont's stock holdings in GM
violated the Clayton Act because they gave duPont a preference as to a
substantial share of GM's requirements of automobile paints and finishes
as long as duPont was able to meet competitive offers in terms of quality,
price and terms of sale.5" Although the opinion is somewhat imprecise, a
reasonable reading of the case is that foreclosure of competitors from equal
access to 15 % of the relevant market violates the Clayton Act. Since prior
opinions by the Court under the Sherman Act in the 1920 Reading 9 case
and the 1948 Columbia Steel"0 case suggest foreclosure in the 13-16% area
would be illegal, the duPont decision came as no surprise on this issue.
However, the courts have gone much further when there was evidence of
intent to foreclose competitors from a market and when the markets involved were concentrated or tending towards concentration. In Brown
Shoe,6' Brown's acquisition of Kinney was held illegal on vertical grounds,
although Kinney had only 1.5% of the total shoe market involved.
This decision was based in part on the Court's findings as to Brown's intent
56. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del.
1969), rev'd 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 567 (1970).
57. See cases cited in text p. 87-89 infra.
58. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
59. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
60. United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 499 (1948).

61. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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to force its shoes into Kinney and as to the trend toward concentration
and integration in the industry. In Standard Oil, 2 the acquisition was held
illegal on vertical grounds although Jersey's requirements of potash were
around 1% of the market. The District Court regarded the potash
industry as highly concentrated and as having high barriers to entry;
although there were already ten producers of potash and five additional
companies had already announced firm plans to enter the market. Kennecott-Okonite 3 and Kimberly Clark 4 are two additional cases wherein
district courts have held vertical mergers illegal despite the fact that the
shares of the markets involved were only 1-2 %. In the former, the market
was already concentrated, and in the latter, the market was becoming
more and more concentrated as a result of numerous acquisitions.
Here, as with horizontal mergers, there are two reasons why the
strict legal doctrine available may not be sufficient to stem the conglomerate merger parade. On the one hand, some conglomerate mergers may not
have vertical aspects, or they may have vertical aspects in which the
shares of the markets involved are substantially less than 1%, or are
somewhat larger than 1% but which involve markets that are not concentrated and are not tending towards concentration. On the other hand,
many conglomerate mergers may involve substantial foreclosures in a few
lines of commerce and the companies involved may voluntarily, or under
court order, divest themselves of the lines of commerce involved. The
government, and ultimately the courts, may conclude that such partial
divestiture satisfies the requirements of the antitrust law. The discussion
of these issues in the horizontal area is applicable here as well.05
IV.

POTENTIAL

COMPETITION

Conglomerate mergers may be illegal if they involve the elimination
of potential competition. In the pending Goodrich-Northwest6 litigation,
for example, the government alleges that Northwest is an active participant in a number of chemical markets which Goodrich has considered
entering; that Goodrich is a major manufacturer of PVC and uses it to
make PVC pipe, a product Northwest has recently considered manufacturing; and that Goodrich and Northwest are potential competitors in
numerous other markets. In the Ling-Tempco-Vought-ones & Laughlin
complaint, the government alleged that "LTV was a potential competitor
in various product lines in which J. & L. Steel was and is a substantial
factor." 7 Furthermore, the government alleged that "J. & L. Steel was
62. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
63. United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); aff'd,
381 U.S. 414 (1965); consent decree, 249 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
64. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
65. See p. 65 supra; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 5 TRAnE REG. REP. (1970
Trade Cas.) f 73,227 at 88, 457 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
66. United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
67. United States v. Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc., 5 Tm zRxo. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
1 73,227 at 88,863 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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a potential competitor in various product lines in which LTV was and is
engaged," and that "each . . . was a potential competitor in various
industries" in which neither had ever been engaged-for example, primary
aluminum and gypsum.6" Both the Northwest and the LTV complaints
also allege that the mergers attacked therein have caused an increase in
overall industrial concentration and will create further additional overall
industrial concentration, thereby "reducing the number of firms capable
of entering concentrated markets"6 9 and "reducing the number of firms
with the capability and incentive for competitive innovation.1 70 The
ITT-Hartford complaint, 71 the Wilson-Nissen72 complaint, and the White
Consolidated-AllisChalmers78 complaint all involve allegations of elimination of potential competition, either in markets in which only one of the
two companies was presently engaged, or in markets in which neither
was engaged.
A merger which eliminates potential competition may violate the
antitrust laws. The Supreme Court recognized that principle in the United
Shoe Machinery74 case over 50 years ago and reaffirmed it in the 1948
Columbia Steel75 case, both of which were brought under the Sherman
Act. In recent years, the Court has repeatedly applied the potential competition doctrine under the Clayton Act. In United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas,7 6 the Court held El Paso's acquisition of Pacific Northwest
illegal because El Paso had 50% of the natural gas market in California
and Pacific Northwest was one of the few natural gas pipelines in a
position to compete for the California market. In Penn-Olin,"' the Court
held that Pennsalt and Olin violated the Clayton Act when they set up
Penn-Olin as a joint venture for the production and sale of sodium
chlorate in the Southwest if, absent the joint venture, either Pennsalt
or Olin would have entered that market, and the other company would
have remained a potential competitor on the edge of the market. Another
example is Procter & Gamble,7 8 wherein the Court held illegal Procter
& Gamble's acquisition of Clorox, in part because the acquisition eliminated Procter & Gamble as a potential entrant into the chlorine bleach
market.
The principal problem in this area is how far the courts will go in
deciding how much potential competition must be eliminated before a
68. Id.
69. See cases cited notes 66 & 67 supra.
70. See cases cited notes 66 & 67 supra.
71. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
72. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. 111.
1968),
consent decree entered, 1968 Trade Cas. 72,585 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
73. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del.
1969), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 567 (1970).
74. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
75. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
76. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
77. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
78. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

merger "may . . . substantially lessen competition." The courts and

economists have traditionally pointed to two ways in which potential
competition may be important. First, there is the so-called "edge effect,"
which occurs even if no potential competitor ever actually enters the
market. Firms in a concentrated industry may compete more vigorously
than otherwise if they know that there are companies outside the market
interested in entering their market. Second, if potential competitors
eventually enter a concentrated market, they thereby increase the number
of competitors in the market and generally, the vigor of competition as
well. Note, however, that the substantiality of both of these effects depends
in part on the degree of concentration in the markets involved. In a market
in which there are already fifty competitors, the competitors in the market
will already be affected so directly by the actual and possible efforts of
their actual competitors that they would probably not be affected substantially, if at all, by the possibility that additional companies might also
enter the market. Similarly, if there are already fifty companies in the
market, the vigor of the competition is not likely to be affected by the
addition of one or two companies who change their status from potential to
actual competitors. An additional factor is also important in measuring
the substantiality of the effect of eliminating a potential competitor: the
number of similarly capable potential competitors. If there is only one
potential competitor, its elimination may have a very substantial effect
on a concentrated market; however, if there are fifty companies equally
interested in, and capable of, entering a particular concentrated market,
elimination of one of those fifty companies will probably have no effect
on the market, since there are forty-nine other companies remaining who
might have an edge effect on the market and who may enter and deconcentrate the market.
In the Clayton Act cases, referred to above, there was evidence of
substantiality within traditional terms. In El Paso Natural Gas,79 the
natural gas market was highly concentrated; El Paso alone had 50%
of the market; Pacific Northwest was in terms of its financial resources,
managerial resources, location of its reserves, location of its pipeline, and
its prior efforts to enter the California market, probably the most likely
potential entrant or at least one of a very few potential entrants into that
market. The evidence showed an actual edge effect due to Pacific Northwest's prior efforts to sell gas to Edison, the largest industrial user of gas
in Southern California. El Paso had to give Edison a firm, as opposed to
an interruptible, supply of gas and bad to cut prices to Edison from 40
cents per mcf to 30 cents per mcf. Indeed, in view of Pacific Northwest's
prior efforts to sell gas to California buyers and the nature of the natural
gas pipeline business, El Paso NaturalGas s' appears to be really an actual
rather than a potential competition case. In Penn-Olin, there were only
two manufacturers and sellers of sodium chlorate in the Southeast.
79. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
80. Id.
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Pennsalt and Olin were in terms of manufacturing know-how, marketing
systems, related chemical operations, prior planning, and interest, two of
the four most likely entrants into the area. 8 ' In Proctor & Gamble, six
companies had 80% of total national sales. Clorox alone had almost 50%
of national sales and much higher shares of several important regional
markets. In terms of Proctor & Gamble's diversification program, its
complementary products sold to the same users through the same
distribution outlets and mechandised in the same manner as bleach, its
financial resources, its technical know-how, and its advertising advantages,
Proctor was the most likely potential entrant into the chlorine bleach
market.12 Thus, none of these recent Supreme Court cases tell us how the
Court will react to the elimination of a potential competitor from a
relatively unconcentrated market or to the elimination of one of ten or
twenty equally effective potential competitors.
Although several highly knowledgeable experts in the area are
somewhat pessimistic about how far the courts will go in developing the
doctrine of potential competition, the judicial authority on the subject is
inconclusive. In the early United Shoe Machinery case," the four justice
majority was skeptical not of the doctrine of potential competition, but
of its effective application. The potential competition, the government, and
subsequent economists relied upon, appeared to the majority either to be
nonexistent or so ephemeral or impossible to measure that it was insubstantial on the one hand, or so potentially powerful, on the other hand, that
United Shoe Machinery was warranted in buying Goddu out in self
defense. In Columbia Steel, the majority found that the potential competition in shipbuilding was insubstantial in view of Consolidated's lack of
financial resources, plant capacity, and the numerous other more substantial potential competitors. Potential competition in steel plates on the
West Coast was insubstantial because the record was insufficient as to
the production and demand for plates in the West and the number of
producers in the market, and also because of the freight disadvantage
U.S. Steel would face competing in the area from the East. 4 The majority
did not explain why U.S. Steel would not have become a substantial
competitor in the West by building a fabricating plant there. This was
an apparent possibility since the evidence showed that U.S. Steel planned
to build fabricating plants in the West before the acquisition became
available, its nationwide market position on fabricated products was 20o,
and it had established customers on the West coast as a result of prior
dealings in other products. But these are Sherman Act, not Clayton Act,
cases. They were narrowly decided cases (one 5-485 and the other 4-386)
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
Id.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
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and Columbia Steel" is one of the cases under the Sherman Act that led
Congress, in reaction, to amend Section 7 of the Clayton Act to apply a
stricter standard to corporate acquisitions. 8
The two significant potential competition cases under the Clayton
Act, other than the Supreme Court cases referred to above, point in
opposite directions. In Wilson-Nissen, Judge Marovitz took a conservative
position as to potential competition although he held the merger illegal on
other grounds.8" The court decided that there was insufficient proof Wilson
would have actually entered the gymnastic equipment industry by internal
expansion, therefore there was no deconcentrating effect eliminated. The
court then found that the evidence showed that firms in the industry
regarded Wilson as one of a small group of potential entrants into the
market, therefor there was an "edge effect" present. However, the court
said that if this were "the only factor, it would not be sufficient."90 The
only explanation 9 ' the court gave for this conclusion was a citation to
a leading article in the field by Professor, subsequently Assistant Attorney
General, Turner.9 2 Professor Turner stated that if one of two or three
of the most likely entrants into a concentrated market acquires one of
the two to four dominant sellers in an industry, the effect is substantial
enough to violate the Clayton Act, but that if a larger number of likely
entrants exist, the effect is not substantial enough to violate the statute."
In Wilson, there were five potential entrants available, rather than the
three Professor Turner used as his maximum. It is apparently for that
reason that Judge Marovitz felt the potential competition effect was an
insufficient basis to hold the merger illegal. That is a very fine line to
draw. Professor Turner himself concedes the mater is a close one,
depending on one's judgment, based in part on the values the Act is
designed to serve and in part on matters on which economists are not
wholly in accord and for which there is scanty empirical data. 4 The
fineness of the line drawn by Professor Turner in this area is indicated
by the fact that while in his 1965 article he concluded it would not be
illegal for a potential entrant to acquire one of the four dominant sellers
in an industry, unless the potential entrant was one of the two or three
most likely entrants into the industry, 5 in 1968, as Assistant Attorney
General, he issued the Merger Guidelines, which concluded that just such
a merger would be illegal as long as the acquirer was one of the most
likely entrants, without limiting the number of most likely entrants to
87.
88.
89.
consent

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
See H. R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1968),
decree entered, 1968 Trade Cas. 1f72,585 (N.D. Il1. 1968).

90. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. Il. 1968).
91. Id. at 567.
92. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H-Iv. L. Rav.
1313 (1965).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1320-322.

95. Id.
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three. 6 In Standard Oil, Judge Shaw took a more liberal view of potential
competition and held the acquisition illegal in an industry in which there
were already ten actual competitors and five additional companies had
already announced they were entering the industry and had taken steps
which would put them in operation by 1970. According to the district
court, if the acquisition were enjoined, "Jersey will probably remain a
potential competitor in the potash industry in the United States market,
likely to enter on a 'grass roots' basis just as soon as continued exploration
for a good potash ore body develops the opportunity.""7 At this point it
should be noted that the potash industry is already less concentrated than
many in America containing at least ten to fifteen large sellers, depending
upon whether you add the five the court found were coming in by 1970.
Furthermore, the court did not find that Jersey was the most likely
entrant. It would have been difficult for the court to so characterize
Jersey, since Jersey had been studying entry for over five years, a period
during which others not only studied entry but, as already indicated, had
already begun their entry. In addition, the same reasons that made
Jersey a potential entrant-financial resources, profitable opportunity,
and desire for a raw material source for its fertilizer operations-would
appear to make most of the major oil companies in the country potential
entrants into the potash business. Indeed, the court itself pointed out that
Cities Service, Continental, Mobil, and Gulf had entered the fertilizer
business since World War II. However, the court listed none of them as
being engaged in the potash business as of the date of the opinion.9 8 In
short, Judge Shaw's approach appears to be that in a relatively concentrated market, no potential competitor of the size of Jersey can be
eliminated without the effect being substantial enough to warrant condemnation under a statute designed to deal with probabilities, not certainties.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken in this area, it
appears likely that it will follow and develop Judge Shaw's approach rather
than Judge Marovitz', at least if the right case reaches it during a continuance of the present conglomerate merger parade. If Section 7 was
designed to preserve an economic way of life, as Chief Justice Warren
pointed out in Brown Shoe,99 and to prevent economic dominance by
large companies, which have grown through merger, as Justice Harlan
stated in Proctor & Gamble,... then it appears reasonable to say that no
company with, for example, over 250 million dollars of assets, which is a
potential competitor in any market where less than twenty companies
have, or appear likely to have around 80% of the total sales, can acquire
96. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(May 30, 1968).
97. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 227 (D.N.J. 1966).
98. Id. at 212.
99. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
100. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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any company with over 1% of the market, without the elimination of the
acquiring company as a potential competitor. This would be regarded as
sufficiently significant, in terms of long term probabilities, to be considered
substantial and therefore illegal under the Clayton Act. There are simply
too many concentrated or concentrating markets to enter for any single
company to enter a significant share of the total in any decade, particularly since many companies will be reluctant to enter markets without
some familiarity with the raw materials, production or marketing techniques or customers involved in the new market.
Furthermore, there are simply too few companies around with over
250 million dollars of assets for us to be unconcerned about the elimination
of any of them as potential competitors in any concentrated or concentrating markets. This is true, at least during the merger parade in which
the size and number of acquisitions by such companies is growing at the
pace encountered in the last few years. Indeed, at the rate at which the top
two hundred largest industrial corporations in the country have been
increasing their share of total manufacturing assets in the country, it
would not be unreasonable for the courts to hold that any acquisition by
any of the top two hundred or so corporations of any medium size company, e.g., a company with over $10 million in assets, is a violation of the
antitrust laws absent unusual circumstances, such as a failing company
situation. For the crucial issue under the Clayton Act, as the Supreme
Court pointed out in Brown Shoe, is not the impact of a particular
acquisition in particular markets, but the impact of a particular acquisition as part of a trend of acquisitions and other industrial developments. 1 '
At the time of the Brown decision, there were still 852 shoe manufacturers in the country. The 24 top manufacturers had only 35% of total
sales, a highly unconcentrated market in the opinion of most, if not all
economists. 10 2 The acquisition affected only 1.5%o of the retail market and
gave Brown only 5o of the retail market in many areas. 10 The Court
struck down the merger, not because its impact was substantial, but
because the Court felt it was part of a trend of concentration and vertical
integration in the industry. This trend, if not halted, would eventually
lead to the very concentrated markets of which Congress disapproved.
Similarly, any substantial acquisition by the top two hundred companies
in the country should be evaluated not only as to its impact on specific
markets, but also as to its tendency to cause overall industrial concentration to a degree disapproved by Congress.
There is another effect the current merger wave may have, unless it
is checked, which appears to fall within the specific terms of Section 7.
It may give rise to an understanding among the two hundred largest
companies in the country that they should not compete too vigorously
101. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id. at 343.
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against each other in any particular line of commerce or geographical area.
Such an understanding would not be too difficult to reach among giants
who were ologopolists in many specific markets and who had thereby
learned the advantages of a live-and-let-live philosophy. The overall effect
of such an understanding would be a serious decline in the vigor of competition throughout the country, not only because of compliance with the
understanding by the giants, but also because of the deterrent effect upon
small to medium sized corporations.
The counter arguments, however, are powerful enough so that the
outcome of the issue is in doubt. True, Congress was concerned with gross
industrial concentration, but it did not pass a statute prohibiting all acquisitions, or all acquisitions by companies over a given size, or all
acquisitions of companies over a given size. Instead, it passed a statute
which only prohibits acquisitions with a probable substantial impact on
competition.' Moreover, such a decision was sound as a matter of public
welfare since it provides a more objective standard than someone's gut
reaction as to how big is too big; it ties the law to competitive markets
which is in the public interest in the long run; and it enables us to benefit
from the efficiencies and increased competition which many huge conglomerate mergers create. As for the threat of overall concentration, merger
waves come and go. This one has not yet reached threatening levels. It
will be time enough to deal with the threats in this area when it is clear
that the present wave is not self-correcting in the market place. If we do
have to deal with the problem, let us do so directly and by specific legislation, precisely designed to balance all the values involved rather than by
gross judicial legislation under the guise of interpreting the antitrust laws.
As for the hypothetical understanding among corporate giants, none has
yet developed, and the contention that one will develop is pure surmise.
It is hardly a substantial enough threat at this stage to warrant sacrificing
0 5
the benefits conglomerates make possible.1

V.

RECIPROCITY

Conglomerate mergers often if not usually lead to reciprocity, i.e., the
use of purchasing power to induce others to purchase one's products or
services. In fact all the recent conglomerate complaints contain allegations of reciprocity. In the pending Goodrich-Northwest complaint, the
government alleges that Goodrich's substantial purchasing power will
benefit Northwest in seeking railroad business and that Northwest's substantial purchases of railroad equipment and petroleum products will
help Goodrich sell tires and industrial products. 106 ITT's purchasing
power, the government alleges, will help Hartford to sell insurance,
104. Clayton Act § 7 (1964).

105. See Turner, supra note 92; See also United States v. I.T.T., 5 TRADE REG. R P.
73,424 (D. Conn. 1970).
106. United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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Grinnell to sell automatic sprinkler systems and related products, and
Container to sell vending and in-plant feeding services. °7 Jones & Laughlin and LTV will allegedly benefit in the sale of their products by reason
of the increased and wider scope of the purchasing power resulting from
LTV's acquisition of J & L stock.108 And the FTC has alleged that Allis
Chalmer's purchases of steel mill products will help White sell rolling
mill equipment to steel companies.' 01
In Consolidated Foods, the Supreme Court clearly established that
a merger creating a probability of substantial reciprocity is illegal under
the Clayton Act." 0 The key question is the meaning of "substantiality."
In ConsolidatedFoods, the acquiring company owned a network of wholesale and retail outlets and was a substantial purchaser of food processor's
products. The food processor bought dehydrated onion and garlic for use
in preparing and packaging their food; Gentree, the acquired company,
was a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic."' The Court held that
since food processors who sold or wanted to sell to Consolidated would
give Gentree their garlic and onion business if it could meet competitive
price and quality terms, the merger had the requisite probable effect on
competition in the dehydrated garlic and onion lines of commerce." 2
Note, however, that the markets affected were very highly concentrated.
The two leading manufacturers of dehydrated garlic and onion had 90%
of the total sales, and Gentree alone had 32% of the market."18 Thus, the
case could readily be disposed of in terms of the oligopoly theory developed
in horizontal competition cases. The markets involved were highly concentrated, so that every unnecessary limitation on the ability of the
smaller competitors within the market to compete and every limitation
on the ability of potential competitors to enter the market should be
eliminated. Reciprocity is an arbitrary limitation which is inherently
anticompetitive; therefore, a merger which creates the probability of
substantial reciprocity is illegal. But what about mergers which create
the probability of substantial reciprocity in unconcentrated markets or
in moderately concentrated markets in favor of, for example, the sixth
largest competitor in the market? Also, what about mergers which create
the possibility but not the probability of reciprocity where the companies
involved, while large in absolute terms, have such a small share of the
purchases involved that any attempt at overt reciprocity would probably
have a negative reaction on most sellers in the market?
Here, as in the case with potential competition, several knowledgeable
107. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
108. United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 5 TRADE RE. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
73,227 at 88,863 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
109. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 522-25 (3d
Cir. 1969).

110. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consol. Food Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Id. at 595.
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experts are pessimistic about the scope of the doctrine and its applicability
to most conglomerate mergers. They feel that unless the markets involved
are highly concentrated and the share of the market affected is substantial,
there is an insufficient basis in economics to conclude that a merger may
substantially lessen competition. The guidelines issued by the Antitrust
Division under Professor Turner,. for example, condemn mergers on
reciprocity grounds only when at least 15% of the purchases in a market
in which one of the merging firms sells are accounted for by firms which
make substantial sales in markets where the other merging firm is both a
substantial buyer and buys substantially more than most of its competitors." 4
The scant judicial authority in the area, however, points the other
way. Although Consolidated Foods involved a very highly concentrated
market, there was little proof that Consolidated had substantial purchasing
power in economic terms. Readily available sources would have shown
Consolidated's total purchases of food products were less than 2% of
total sales." 5 Moreover, while Justice Douglas' majority opinion held
that all mergers which create a reasonable probability of substantial
reciprocity were not illegal under the Clayton Act, the only exception
specifically noted was a merger involving de minimus reciprocity,""
hardly an important exception for a Court which has already held that
tie-in sales of $50,000 were not de minimus." 7 Recently, the Third Circuit
directed entry of a preliminary injunction in the Allis Chalmers-White
Consolidated suit. The court relied on the probability that the merger
would give rise to substantial reciprocity in the sale of rolling mills to
steel companies as sufficient ground for concluding that the merger was
probably illegal under the Clayton Act."' Judge Stahl clearly stated that
where reciprocity was involved, the merging parties' share of the total
purchases in the market involved was not the crucial figure. The significant
figures were the merging parties' total purchases compared to their competitors' purchases."' Since White's and Allis' total purchases of steel
from steel companies were greater than purchases of steel by any other
manufacturer of rolling mills, the court concluded that steel companies
would favor White-Allis in their purchases of rolling mills. That effect was
sufficient to warrant a conclusion of illegality.
The approach of the court in White-Allis Chalmers appears more
114. DEPT. Or JUSTICE, REPORT ON MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 TRADE REG. REP. ff 4430
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consistent with Congressional intent than the approach of the commentators and is probably more likely to prevail in the long run. If Congress
was concerned with rising corporate concentration as well as with the
protection of smaller corporations from the adverse consequences of a
trend of acquisitions by large corporations, it would appear reasonable to
carry out Congress' intent by holding that any acquisition by a large company which creates a market situation in which the large company is
favored at the expense of most of its smaller competitors is illegal. Furthermore, since every acquisition by a large company thereby substantially
enlarges the scope and size of the purchases available to the acquired
company, and since we are witnessing a merger wave, the long-run overall
impact of this trend on the ability of independent smaller and mediumsize companies to compete equally for business on the basis of price,
quality, and service will be substantial. Therefore, it would be reasonable
to hold on "reciprocity effect" grounds alone that any acquisition of a
company with assets of over ten million dollars by a company with assets
of over 250 million dollars is illegal under the Clayton Act absent exceptional circumstances.
It has been argued that even if the probability of substantial reciprocity may be a sufficient ground to condemn a merger, the proper remedy
is an injunction against the merged company engaging in reciprocal trading
agreements with its suppliers, rather than ordering divestiture of the
acquired company. This contention is related to the position discussed
above, that the proper relief in the case of a conglomerate merger with
horizontal effects is divestiture of the overlapping assets, rather than
total divestiture.120 But there is a further weakness in this position in the
reciprocity area. All an injunction can do is prohibit overt attempts at
reciprocity and eliminate the detailed accounting and personnel machinery
required to make a reciprocity program fully effective. It cannot eliminate
the tendency of suppliers to favor their customers with purchases in the
hope that their customers will thereby favor them in return or give them
a chance to maintain or increase sales. Furthermore, as more huge conglomerates are formed, each having tremendous purchasing power, a wide
variety of products and services required for their operation, and a wide
variety of products and services available for sale, it becomes apparent
that no injunction can prohibit a community of interest developing among
the huge conglomerates. Price, quality, terms, and conditions of sale being
substantially similar, it pays to buy from someone within the group of
huge conglomerates. Those purchases insure the greatest possibility of
maintaining and increasing one's overall sales.' The simplest and surest
way of preventing such a community of interest from arising as a result
of a series of acquisitions by very large companies is to prohibit these
120. See notes 47-50 supra and corresponding text.
121. See generally note 119 supra; and Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and
Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231 (1967).
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acquisitions rather than allowing the acquisitions to occur subject to
numerous detailed but ineffective injunctions.
VI.

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

Conglomerate mergers may be illegal under the Clayton Act if they
create competitive advantages for the merging companies which deter
competitors within the merged company's markets from competing vigorously with the merged company or which deter potential competitors
from entering the merged company's markets. In the .ITT-Hartford
case, for example, the government alleged that "the competitive advantages which will accrue to the defendants which are leading firms in
several industries, as a result of this merger, will raise barriers to entry
1 22
and discourage smaller firms from competing in these industries.'

Similar allegations appear in the ITT-Grinnel12 and the Allis Chalmers
-White

124

complaints and also in the Wilson-Nissen125 litigation.

The leading Supreme Court decision dealing with competitive advantage as an indicator of a Clayton Act violation is Procter & Gamble,
where the Court held Proctor's acquisition of Clorox illegal. Two of the
reasons for the Court's finding of illegality were as follows: First: "smaller
firms would become more cautious in competing due to their fear of
retaliation by Procter"' 2 6 and second, "a new entrant would be more
reluctant to face the giant Procter than it would have been to face the
smaller Clorox.' 27 Of course, Procter & Gamble can be read narrowly.
In fact, Justice Harlan demonstrated in his concurring opinion how the
majority's position could be rationalized in terms of traditional conservative oligopoly theory. The bleach industry was highly concentrated thus
all unnecessary restrictions on the vigor of competition and entry by
potential competitors should be eliminated. The addition of Proctor &
Gamble's resources to Clorox's probably restricted competitive vigor in
the industry and deterred new entry. Potential entrants would be discouraged by Proctor & Gamble's huge financial resources, huge advertising budget, the advertising discounts available to Proctor but not to
Clorox, and Proctor & Gamble's tenacity in reacting to competitive entry
into a particular geographical market. 2 However, Justice Douglas'
opinion for the majority is not as limited as Justice Harlan's concurrence.
Justice Douglas asserts that "there is every reason to assume" that smaller
companies would become more cautious in competing with Proctor &
Gamble than Clorox and that Proctor & Gamble would probably become
122. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
123. Id.
124. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del.
1969), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 567 (1970).
125. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
consent decree entered, 1968 Trade Cas. 72,585 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
126. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 575 (1967).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 581 (concurring opinion).
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a price leader. 12 9 If he was relying on the fact that Proctor & Gamble was
much larger than Clorox-it had assets of over five hundred million and
sales of over one billion in 1957, while Clorox had assets of only twelve
million and sales of forty million 13 0-then the acquisition of Clorox by any
of the 300 largest industrial corporations in the country with over 250
million dollars of assets would appear to be similarly illegal.
Justice Douglas may have relied in part on the advertising discounts
available to Proctor and not to Clorox, but the logic inherent in his statement indicates the advertising discounts were not crucial. For if the key
to the situation is the smaller firms' "fear of retaliation by Proctor," it
would seem reasonable to "assume" a "fear of retaliation" if they competed too vigorously against any merged company with assets of over
250 million dollars. Moreover, if "fear of retaliation" is the key to the
decision, it also appears that the oligopoly situation in the bleach industry
and Clorox's dominant position in that market also appear to be relevant
but not decisive facts. This follows since acquisition by a corporate giant
of the sixth largest firm, for example, in a relatively unconcentrated
medium-size industry would probably lead the remaining companies to
fear retaliation from the corporate giant.
Justice Harlan attempted to tie the Clorox decision to the case's
facts, but he inadequately explained how to determine when the effects
present in Clorox would be sufficiently significant to be substantial within
the meaning of the Clayton Act.' 3 ' For example, he regarded the bleach
industry as oligopolistic in terms of pricing decisions, but he said that if
the evidence showed that the smaller companies' pricing decisions were
cost-determined and set an effective ceiling on Clorox's prices through the
mechanism of an acceptable differential, the merger would not be illegal. 2
But most prices are cost determined to some extent, and most unbranded
or locally branded prices set ceilings on branded prices through some
differential. How does one know how high cost-determined prices must
be or how much of a margin is acceptable before Justice Harlan will allow
a giant corporation to buy a medium-size corporation in a concentrated
industry? Moreover, once a market is sufficiently oligopolistic in its
pricing mechanism to concern Justice Harlan, how do we know when there
is a sufficient deterrent to vigorous competition or to entry so as to
warrant condemnation. For example, while Proctor & Gamble was much
larger than Clorox, Clorox was already much larger than most of the
companies in the bleach industry. Clorox had $12 million in assets,
whereas there were only eight companies which had over a million dollars
in assets, and very few had assets over $75,000.131 Additionally, although
Proctor & Gamble could easily increase the dollars spent advertising
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 579.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 581-604.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 571.
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Clorox bleach, what evidence was there that Clorox was not already
spending as much on advertising as was profitable?
The competitive advantage theory is similar to the vertical foreclosure and reciprocity theories discussed above. Indeed, those theories
may be regarded as merely specific examples of competitive advantages
resulting from mergers-preferred access to supplies or customers in the
one case and the reciprocity effect in the other. Therefore, most of the
discussion above is relevant here. A few additional comments are appropriate here which were also relevant to the foreclosure and reciprocity
issues. First, so called competitive advantages often simply do not exist;
e.g., a merger of two large companies may appear to give the resulting
firm a competitive advantage based on increased size, but the additional
assets may actually be a detriment. rather than a benefit if the assets are
invested in unprofitable operations or burdened with excessive debt
obligations. Second, even if a competitive advantage may be theoretically
available on paper, it may not be realizable in practice. For example, a
merger between firms with manufacturing operations in California and a
retail operation in the same industry in New England may not result in
any foreclosure of competitors from either a source of supply or retail
outlets. It may be that the costs of shipping goods from California to
New England will be prohibitive, or that the quality of the product may
deteriorate during long shipments, or that speed of delivery may be an
important aspect of service in the industry. Third, even if a competitive
advantage exists and is realizable in practice, it may not be profitable for
a company to attempt to realize the advantage. A company with substantially more resources than all the other companies in the industry combined
could engage in below cost price wars or other predatory behavior to
eliminate half the competitors in the industry, but the long run profits
from increasing its share of market might not be sufficient to cover the
short run costs of the predatory behavior. Once the predatory behavior
ceased, either voluntarily or under court order, new competitors might
reenter the industry in substantial numbers and dissipate the company's
short run increase in market position. Fourth, even assuming a realizable
competitive advantage would be utilized, it may not have a substantial
impact on competitive conditions or an unfair impact on competitors. The
impact may be quite small in view of the power involved and the numerous
other factors affecting market position. Whatever other effects the LTVJones & Laughlin merger may have, for example, it is quite unlikely that
the increase in assets of the J & L Steel Company will deter vigorous
competition in the steel industry through fear of retaliation. Fifth, the
impact may actually result in an increase in the vigor of competition in the
industry. Assume, for example, that a multi-billion dollar diversified company has 80% of total sales of an important piece of equipment to the
railroad industry; that there are only two other manufacturers of the
product involved, both small single line companies; and that those two
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smaller companies were acquired by multi-market billion dollar companies
whose total annual railroad shipments were such that they could be and
were used to increase the sales of the smaller companies. Under these
circumstances, competition in the sale of the product involved would appear to have been increased. Of course, the merger may have raised
barriers to entry into the industry, but those barriers may have already
been so high that no entry was reasonably probable except by those who
would not be deterred by the mergers anyway. Finally, and this is one of
the most troublesome issues in the area, some competitive advantages
achieved through merger are based on increased efficiency. In the railroad
equipment example given above, assume that the smaller companies'
increased sales enables the companies involved to achieve economies of
scale which reduce unit-costs substantially. A conglomerate merger may
make computer services, cost control techniques, and other advanced
managerial techniques available to a theretofore family-run operation,
thus substantially increasing the efficiency of the business. It may also
make production or marketing technology available from a related field,
or it may introduce aggressive management into a rigid stultifying oldline industry which will seek out new ways to satisfy consumer needs in the
area. One of the main reasons a competitive economy is preferred is that
a competitive economy is efficient in allocating resources to their most
productive position in the economy thus producing newer and better goods
and service at lower prices.' Therefore, it is somewhat incongruous to
condemn a merger for creating efficiencies under a statute whose test of
legality speaks in terms of maximizing competition which, in turn, is
desired because it promotes efficiency.
The dilemma is real and inescapable. It is not unique in this area of
antitrust. Two basic issues are involved: social versus private economies
and the basic purposes of antitrust. There are activities which result in a
company's saving money but which do not result in society saving resources. This is so either because the saving to the company is simply a
shift of cost from one firm to another(e.g., numerous discriminatory price
situations) or because the company is using society's resources without
paying for them (e.g., numerous pollution situations). These activities
are examples of private economies which society has no reason to encourage as opposed to social economies which increase society's wealth and
which society does have reason to promote. Although the general concept
of social or private economies is widely accepted, there is difficulty in determining whether a particular form of activity involves social or merely
private economies. The most common illustration of the problem in the
merger area arises in connection with advertising economies. Some experts
feel that since advertising is often used to create irrational brand preferences which distort competition by creating pockets of market power for
134. See United States Steel Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 5 TRADE: Rc.
Trade Cas.) g 73,167 at 88,596 (6th Cir. 1970).
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branded items, it then becomes plausible to believe that mergers which
create advertising economies and increase product differentiation are
therefor not the kind of activity society should encourage by allowing the
mergers that create them."3 5 Others contend that it is almost impossible to
draw a line between advertising which creates "irrational" consumer demand and advertising which educates consumers and creates sufficient
consumer demand to realize economies of scale of production and distribution. Since it is rational for consumers to rely on brands for psychological
values deemed desirable by consumers and for assurances as to quality,
consumers should be allowed to decide what is rational and what is irrational advertising by exercising their purchasing power in the market place,
rather than have government officials make those decisions for them.
There is a similar split of authority on the efficiency issue. Some
experts argue that the basic purpose of antitrust is to maximize the community's wealth by maximizing efficiency in the allocation and use of its
resources. They argue that no merger which creates efficiencies should
be condemned and that the competitive advantage theory should be eliminated, at least to the extent that the competitive advanage involved is
based on any efficiency created by a merger. Other experts reach a similar
result by contending that, while efficiency is not the sole goal of antitrust,
it is so important that no merger should be condemned solely on the ground
that it creates efficiencies. There are two difficulties with this position.
First, competition is usually the most efficient way to organize and operate
an economy only as a long run process. Therefore, it is eventually more
efficient to prohibit activities which maximize efficiency in the short run
but which also lead to noncompetitive market structures which are inefficient in the long run. This has been the general approach of the courts
toward efficiency under the antitrust laws; i.e., efficiencies are generally
desirable but not at the expense of destroying competitively structured
markets. Second, as already indicated, Congress has repeatedly indicated
in enacting antitrust legislation, and the courts have repeatedly held in
applying the antitrust laws, that efficiency was not the sole or most important value to be promoted. The reports and debates which led to amendment of the Clayton Act did not indicate any concern about efficiency or
the effect that a strict merger law would have on efficiency. The legislators
were concerned with the impact of the merger movement on individual
opportunity, the ability of small businessmen to survive, local control of
business, and control of numerous markets by a few corporations. The
greatest concern was with the large share of the country's total manufacturing assets that were falling into the hands of fewer and fewer corporate
hands and the threat that such increasing absolute concentration would
eventually cause the nation to become socialist, communist, or fascist,
which was the European experience. Congressman Celler's statement that
135. See, e.g., Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations oj the Anti-Merger Act, 68 CoLux. L. REv. 1231, 1258-264 (1968).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

"mergers are usually the forerunners of collectivism and socialism and
therein lies the danger"' 186 was typical of the statements in both the
House and the Senate when the Clayton Act was amended. With that
background judicially recognized by the Supreme Court in Brown' 7 and
Proctor & Gamble,1 8 it seems reasonable to contend that at least during
a merger wave of the dimensions occuring in recent years, any merger
involving one of the top 200 to 300 companies in the country which may
substantially lessen competition is illegal, even where the probable effect
on competition is due to efficiencies created by the merger. This is so
because the economic way of life threatened by the merger wave is more
important than the efficiencies sacrificed by such an approach. The issue
is a close one when efficiency is created by mergers involving only mediumsize corporations. However, where acquisitions by very large corporations
are involved, those who contend that efficiency should never be the basis
for declaring a merger illegal are in effect substituting their value judgments for that of Congress.
VIl.

CONCLUSION

Conglomerate mergers, like most forms of business activity, may
increase efficiency or competition and thereby increase the community's
wealth. On the other hand they may have neutral or adverse effects on
either or both efficiency or competition. Since conglomerate mergers are
simply one form of business activity and mergers in toto are simply one
form of a market, (part of the market for capital assets) those who rely
on free market behavior to organize and operate the economy are and
should be reluctant to interfere with conglomerate merger activity. However, since mergers so often directly change market structure, and since
market structure normally conditions market behavior, some way of
delineating those mergers which change market structure by reducing the
workability of competition therein and those mergers which either increase
or have a slight effect on competition must be identified. Furthermore,
since mergers affect the degree of overall industrial concentration, and
thus may affect important political and social values as well as competition
in specific markets, the effect of mergers on these goals cannot be ignored.
The purpose of this discussion has been to describe as specifically as
possible those elements which the courts have considered in drawing the
line between legal and illegal mergers; to point out some of the problem
areas involved; to consider the arguments pro and con on certain issues;
and to suggest that an important, if not overriding, factor the courts
should and probably will take into account in their evaluation of acquisitions by the top 200 to 300 industrial corporations in the country is that
136. 95 CoNG. REC. 11486 (1949).
137. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
138. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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the overall impact of an unchecked merger wave by these corporations
would so increase overall industrial concentration that the economic way
of life Congress sought to preserve in amending the Clayton Act in 1950
may be destroyed.

